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PRO-CHOICE AND PRESUMPTION:
A REPLY TO KENNETH EINAR HIMMA
Mark C. Murphy

Kenneth Einar Himma has argued that Christians can reasonably adopt a prochoice position on abortion on the basis that Christians can reasonably believe
that abortion does not hann the fetus. I show that Himma is mistaken: even if
immense benefits to the fetus occur 'downstream' from the act of abortion, the
act itself cannot be characterized as anything other than an act of harming.
Further, it would be presumptuous for Christians to rely on God's gift of eternallife to compensate for the harm to the fetus that occurs in abortion.

Kermeth Einar Hinuna is of course right to say that the grievous sinfulness
of abortion does not provide, on its own, decisive reason to legally proscribe iU And while I would not endorse Himma's "Protection Principle"
- that is, that the reasonable justifications for legally proscribing an action
are exhausted by the harm done or offense given to parties other than the
agent of the action (p. 176) - I agree that it is a position that a reasonable
Christian could endorse. Himma wants to say, though, that starting from
these assumptions there is a way to construct a pro-choice position on
abortion that a reasonable Christian could accept. For, even granting that a
fetus is a person and suffers serious harm from the act of abortion, the fact
that a Christian can reasonably believe that, overall, the fetus is not harmed
by that act should help us to see that a Christian can reasonably reject the
legal proscription of abortion. While there may be other reasons to outlaw
abortion besides harm to the fetus - effects on third parties, offense, etc.
- surely it is the overall harm done to the fetus that provides the most
plausible justification for overriding the woman's presumptive right to
bodily autonomy; and if a Christian can reasonably believe that all things
considered there is, as the title of Himma's paper armounces, "no harm"
done to the fetus, the Christian can reasonably affirm a pro-chOice view.
How does Himma reach the remarkable conclusion that a Christian can
reasonably believe that the fetus - which he assumes to be a person, a
bearer of rights and interests2 - is not, overall, harmed when aborted?
When a fetus is aborted, he or she is deprived, in Don Marquis's words, of
"a future like ourS."3 But Christians believe that the earthly future of
which a fetus is deprived by abortion is not all the good that a person can
enjoy: a person can also enjoy the infinite good of heaven, a good that
dwarfs the goods available in our earthly lives. And Christians can reasonably believe that in virtue of the fetus' necessary moral irmocence, he or she
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will receive a "free pass to heaven" (p. 180). Thus, a Christian can reasonably believe that aborting a fetus does not harm that fetus; and therefore
that Christian can further reasonably believe that the fact that there is
strong reason for the state to legally proscribe activities that do grievous
harm to persons does not show that there is any reason to legally proscribe
abortion. 4
Himma is mistaken. The act of abortion is correctly categorized as harming the fetus, but it is not correctly categorized as harming the fetus and providing the fetus with the beatific vision. An abortion destroys a fetus' bodily
integrity, and deprives the fetus of the possibility of enjoying any further
earthly goods. These are harms. But the abortion does not bring about the
fetus' enjoying the beatific vision. If the fetus enjoys the beatific vision
upon being aborted - I will assume for the sake of argument that Himma
is right that it is reasonable for a Christian to believe this5 - the fetus'
enjoying that good is caused not by the agent's act of aborting the fetus but
by God's graciously conferring the gift of eternal life on the child. For not
every good or evil that occurs downstream from an act counts as a benefit
or harm conferred by that act. This is particularly clear in those cases in
which the benefit or harm would not have occurred but for some agent's
free intervention. That the causal chain from act to effect is broken by the
intervention of a free agent is a standard view, both in common sense's
attribution of responsibility and in the law's.6 If, for example, a traveler is
beaten and left for dead by robbers, is rescued by a Samaritan, and by this
transformative experience comes to have a much better life than he or she
would otherwise have had, it is nevertheless incorrect to say that the robbers did not harm, or even benefited, the traveler. The robbers merely
harmed the traveler; the Samaritan benefited the traveler.
If, then, abortion is not properly described as providing the fetus with
some benefit, there is nothing to that act but harm. And if there is nothing
to it but harm, then Himma has not shown that a reasonable Christian can
hold that abortion does not harm the fetus and is thus not an appropriate
object of legal proscription.
One might, I suppose, say that even if the abortion does nothing but
harm the fetus, surely as Christians we can take into account God's drawing the child into eternal life when deciding upon whether to legally proscribe the practice. But it seems to me that this would also be a mistake.
Consider an analogous case. Suppose that I am a teacher who has authority to lay down rules for how students in a schoolyard are to treat one
another. Bully, a ten-year-old, has an unfortunate tendency to beat up
Victim, a six-year-old. I know - though Victim does not, and probably
would be unable to appreciate it, if he did know - that Victim's uncle,
who was himself the object of bullies when he was a child, takes pity on
Victim and deposits $1000 into Victim's trust fund whenever Victim takes
a beating. At this rate, Victim may well accumulate quite a nest egg, long
after the beatings by the neighborhood thug are forgotten. In this situation,
does the harm that Victim suffers at the hands of Bully provide me with
reason to prohibit Bully from beating Victim?
It seems clear that it does. Bully's acts do nothing but harm Victim.
Victim's uncle does the good. In prohibiting the beating, I am prohibiting
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the harming. Indeed, imagine what you would think of me if I did not
treat the Victim's suffering at the hands of Bully as a strong reason for prohibiting the beatings. I would in that case be deeply presumptuous, relying
on the Victim's uncle to compensate for the harm suffered by Victim, harm
that it was in my power to prevent or at least to ameliorate.
That is why Christians should reject Himma's argument. In relying on
God to compensate for the harm done to innocent unborn children, refusing to protect them from harm when they could be protected from harm,
we are presumptuous with respect to God's willingness to bestow abundant
blessings upon us. And that is something that no reasonable Christian
could advocate.
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NOTES
1. "No Harm, No Foul: Abortion and the Implications of Fetal Innocence,"
Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002), pp. 172-194, p. 173. Page numbers in parenthesiS
in my text refer to this article.
2. Himma remarks on what he takes to be the difficulties in showing that
intentionally killing someone ham1s that person (p. 177). I think that Himma
badly overstates these difficulties, but at any rate they are not central to his
argument.
3. "An Argument that Abortion is Wrong," in John Arthur, ed., Morality
and Moral Controversies (Prentice Hall, 1999), pp. 187-195, p. 190, cited in
Himma's article at p. 179.
4. Himma rightly notes that the view that the fetus is not harmed by an
abortion is compatible with the view that abortion is grievously sinful (p. 181).
One can believe that abortion does not harm a fetus while believing that its sinfulness derives from taking a life that one had no right to take. (Thus Socrates
thought that it would be wrong for him to kill himself to free himself from his
body, though he thought that the condition in which he was free from his body
would be better for him than the condition in which he was tied to it. See the
Phaedo, 61c-63c.)
5. It is worth noting, though, that there is an illicit slide in Himma's argument from the plausible claim that a Christian can reasonably believe that a cllild
that dies prior to being born is assured of entrance into heaven to the claim that a
reasonable Christian may fully rely on that belief in making decisions about
whether the child should be protected from obvious and devastating earthly
harms. I may have a number of reasonable beliefs about what would serve or
detract from your interests. But if I am responsible for looking out for your welfare - as the state is, or should be, responsible for looking out for the well-being
of its most vulnerable members - it is not at all obvious that I should permit
you to suffer certain and devastating harm if I am merely reasonably confident that
you will receive abundant compensating benefits. The episternic threshold in
such a case would surely be higher here than mere reasonableness of belief.
6. For the classic statement see H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honore, Causation
in the Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 1985); see also Alan Donagan, The
Theory of Morality (University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 37-52.

